TODO: This section needs further development and refinement.
TODO: This section needs further development and refinement.
TODO: This section needs further development and refinement.
As well as sections marked as non-normative, all authoring guidelines, diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-normative. Everything else in this specification is normative.
The key words MAY and MUST in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119]] [[RFC8174]] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
The Agent Identity module defines how agents identify, authenticate, and establish trust across different platforms, organizations, and deployment environments. It uses Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) as the core identity primitive while remaining agnostic to the DID method used by an agent. This specification defines the Web-based did:wba method and a common Agent Identity layer in which did:wba, native did:web, and did:webvh identities can interoperate.
The did:wba method is extended from did:web. It keeps the operational advantages of Web infrastructure while adding constraints for DID Document processing, path-based cryptographic binding, service discovery, and cross-platform authentication. The default path profile binds an Ed25519 public key fingerprint into the DID path through the e1_ segment, strengthening the relationship between a DID and the private key controlled by the DID subject.
Cross-platform authentication is based on HTTP Message Signatures and Digest Fields. A client signs the request using a verification method in its DID Document. The server resolves and validates that document according to the identifier's DID method, verifies the authentication relationship, and verifies the request-body integrity without requiring a proprietary identity federation.
The design reuses mature Web infrastructure, including DNS, HTTPS, Web PKI, HTTP caching, and ordinary Web hosting, while preserving the decentralized identity model. Each platform may keep its own account and domain management system, but agents can still interoperate across platforms through resolvable DID Documents and standardized verification methods.
The Agent Identity layer is DID-method-agnostic: common authentication and authorization behavior is defined independently of any one DID method, while creation, resolution, update, deactivation, and method-specific validation remain governed by the selected DID method. Method-specific security properties MUST NOT be assumed for identities created by another method.
The DID method name encoded in the DID is authoritative. Implementations MUST determine the resolution and verification method from the DID itself and MUST NOT require duplicate metadata declaring the same method.
For path-type did:wba DIDs using the default profile, the DID path carries a binding public key fingerprint. This makes the relationship between the DID and the subject-controlled key independently verifiable. Even when a platform hosts the DID Document, a verifier can still compare the document key material with the fingerprint embedded in the DID path and detect silent key substitution.
A DID is treated as a verifiable identifier rather than a stable human-readable name. Rotation and persistence semantics depend on the DID method: for example, changing the binding key changes a path-type did:wba DID, while did:webvh represents authorized changes through its verifiable history. Stable user-facing references can be provided by an upper-layer Agent Name Service, similar to DNS.
Native did:web and did:webvh identifiers can participate in authentication, Handle-based name binding, service discovery, and end-to-end encryption when they satisfy the common requirements and their respective method-specific rules defined in this section.
The name string used to identify this DID method is wba. DIDs using this method must start with the following prefix: did:wba. According to the DID specification, this string must be lowercase. The remainder of the DID (after the prefix) is specified below.
The method-specific identifier is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) protected by TLS and optionally contains the path to the DID document. The formal rules describing the syntax of valid domain names are described in RFC1035, RFC1123, and RFC2181.
The method-specific identifier must match the server certificate according to modern TLS service authentication rules. Domain name matching MUST be based on the DNS identifier (dNSName) in the certificate's subjectAltName extension; implementations MUST NOT rely on Common Name (CN) as the basis for service identity matching. Method-specific identifiers must not contain IP addresses. Port numbers can be included, but the colon between the host and port must be percent-encoded to prevent conflicts with paths. Directories and subdirectories can be optionally included, using colons instead of slashes as separators.
did:wba supports two forms:
For newly created path-type did:wba, this specification defines "the last segment of the path carries the binding public key fingerprint" as the default scheme. The path segments before the fingerprint segment are defined by the implementer, such as user:alice, agents:billing, etc.
ABNF is defined as follows:
base64url-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
path-segment = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" / ".")
e1-fingerprint = "e1_" 43base64url-char
wba-root-did = "did:wba:" domain-name
wba-path-did = "did:wba:" domain-name 1*(":" path-segment) ":" e1-fingerprint
wba-did = wba-root-did / wba-path-did
Description:
- The main specification default path profile only defines
e1_.
The usage of did:wba:{domain} is similar to did:web:{domain}. The main rules are as follows:
did:wba:example.com corresponds to https://example.com/.well-known/did.jsone1_ path binding fingerprint, so the path binding verification rules of this specification for the e1_ path type DID do not apply;keyid exists and is authorized by the authentication relationship, and then uses the corresponding public key to verify the request signature.See the native did:web compatibility section for details on how native did:web identifiers can participate in the same authentication model.
e1_ binds public key fingerprintFor newly created path type did:wba, the last path segment MUST be the e1_ binding public key fingerprint segment. e1_ indicates that the binding key is the Ed25519 public key, and the DID adopts the main specification default profile.
The recommended structure is as follows:
did:wba:{domain}:{namespace...}:{e1-fingerprint}
Example:
did:wba:example.com
did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>
did:wba:example.com%3A3000:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>
To be compatible with existing deployments, the parser MAY support the parsing of historical path-type DIDs without fingerprint segments; however, newly created path-type DIDs SHOULD adopt the default scheme defined in this specification.
e1_ fingerprint generation method (recommended)The e1_ fingerprint is used to associate a path-type DID with the Ed25519 binding public key. The generation method is as follows:
Multikey / publicKeyMultibase in DID documents;authentication relationship of the DID document.publicKeyMultibase to the equivalent public key JWK. The equivalent JWK retains only the necessary fields required by RFC 7638:{
"crv": "Ed25519",
"kty": "OKP",
"x": "..."
}
Specifically:
publicKeyMultibase must be Multibase base58-btc encoded Ed25519 Multikey;x is the base64url (without padding) representation of this 32-byte public key.= padding. The encoding result length is fixed at 43 characters.e1_ prefix in front of the encoding result to get the final path segment.Notes:
e1_ prefix is not part of the hash output, but the profile prefix;e1_ prefix as the kid or fragment of the verification method to facilitate the intuitive correspondence between the DID path and the verification method identification;e1_ profile.Due to the way most web servers render content, it is likely that a particular did:wba document will be served with the media type application/json. If a document named did.json is retrieved, the following processing rules should be followed:
@context exists at the root of the JSON document, the document is successfully processed through JSON-LD, and the context contains https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1, it can be further processed into a DID Document according to Section 6.3.2 of the DID Core specification.serviceEndpoint MUST use absolute URIs.#key-1); when the parser processes such references, it must expand based on the document root DID.NOTE: This includes external URLs embedded in key material and other metadata, which prevents key obfuscation attacks.
Apart from DID Core, most related specifications are still in the draft stage. This section shows a subset of DID Documents used for authentication. To improve interoperability between systems, all fields marked as required must be supported by all systems, while fields marked as optional may be supported selectively. Fields defined in other standards but not listed here may also be supported selectively.
The following e1 path-type DID document example includes core identity fields and optional illustrative service entries:
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
"https://w3id.org/security/data-integrity/v2",
"https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1",
"https://w3id.org/security/suites/x25519-2019/v1"
],
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>",
"verificationMethod": [
{
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1",
"type": "Multikey",
"controller": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>",
"publicKeyMultibase": "z6Mk..."
},
{
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-x25519-1",
"type": "X25519KeyAgreementKey2019",
"controller": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>",
"publicKeyMultibase": "z9hFgmPVfmBZwRvFEyniQDBkz9LmV7gDEqytWyGZLmDXE"
}
],
"authentication": [
"did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1"
],
"assertionMethod": [
"did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1"
],
"keyAgreement": [
"did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-x25519-1"
],
"service": [
{
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#ad",
"type": "AgentDescription",
"serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/agents/alice/ad.json"
},
{
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#handle",
"type": "ANPHandleService",
"serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/.well-known/handle/alice"
},
{
"id": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#anp",
"type": "ANPMessageService",
"serviceEndpoint": "https://example.com/anp",
"serviceDid": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800"
}
],
"proof": {
"type": "DataIntegrityProof",
"cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022",
"created": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"verificationMethod": "did:wba:example.com%3A8800:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1",
"proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",
"proofValue": "z..."
}
}
The ANP-related service entries in this DID Document are illustrative examples only. ANP is an external protocol family and is distinct from this W3C Community Group protocol; their inclusion here does not require implementations of this specification to support ANP services.
Field explanation:
https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1 is required. For e1 documents using the standard Ed25519 proof, https://w3id.org/security/data-integrity/v2 and https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1 are also required. Others are added as needed.%3A. Use a colon later to split the path. For newly created path DIDs, the last path segment MUST be e1_<fingerprint>.verificationMethod should contain both the signature key and the key agreement key to achieve key separation. The signing key is used for identity authentication and document assertion; the key agreement key (such as X25519KeyAgreementKey2019) is used for key negotiation of upper-layer protocols or receipt of confidential information. Both types of keys perform their own duties, and the leakage of a single key will not affect identity authentication and communication confidentiality at the same time.For a path-type DID using the default path scheme, there MUST be at least one Ed25519 Multikey in verificationMethod as a binding key, and the RFC 7638 thumbprint of its equivalent public key JWK is exactly the same as the last e1_ fingerprint segment of the DID path.
Subfield:
authentication relationship. By default, cross-platform authentication should prefer signing with this binding key.Multikey used to generate the proof MUST be authorized by assertionMethod.keyAgreement can be a string reference (pointing to an entry in verificationMethod) or an embedded object. For end-to-end encryption (E2EE) scenarios, this field is used to provide key negotiation material to the upper layer protocol. The upper layer protocol can be direct messaging end-to-end encryption Profile, group end-to-end encryption Profile or other security overlays defined in the future; this specification does not hardcode keyAgreement into a specific algorithm process. New deployments should typically contain X25519KeyAgreementKey2019 or the semantically equivalent X25519 entry. If there is no keyAgreement in the DID document or no negotiation entry available for the upper layer protocol, it means that the agent does not support the relevant E2EE capabilities.Subfield:
AgentDescription: an agent description service. serviceEndpoint points to an agent description document, such as a document described by the Agent Description section of this specification.ANPHandleService and ANPMessageService: examples of service types used by the external ANP ecosystem. They are shown here only to illustrate that a DID Document can reference services defined by other protocols. This specification does not define these ANP service types, their endpoint formats, or their processing requirements. Implementations that do not support ANP may ignore these service entries according to local policy.e1_ profile, proof is a required field; for other profiles, whether this field appears is determined by the corresponding profile rules. proof is used to express the integrity proof of the DID Document, proving that the DID Document has not been tampered with after generating the proof, and indicating that the signer controlled the corresponding private key when the proof was created. Proof itself does not replace the DID method parsing process alone, nor does it alone replace the id consistency check.DataIntegrityProof + eddsa-jcs-2022 proof profiles based on W3C standards.Note:
- Public key information currently supports two formats,
publicKeyJwkandpublicKeyMultibase. See verification method properties for details.- For verification method type definition, see verification method types. For e1 binding keys,
Multikeyis recommended.- For scenarios that need to support end-to-end encryption communication, it is recommended to adopt a key separation design: the signature/assertion key and the key agreement key are managed separately. Signing/assertion keys do not participate in key agreement, and key agreement keys do not participate in signing. The specific use of these materials is defined by the upper layer direct messaging E2EE, group E2EE and other Profiles.
- For newly created path-type DIDs using the default path scheme, the binding key MUST satisfy:
- represented using
Multikey/publicKeyMultibase;- authorized by the
authenticationrelationship;- The RFC 7638 thumbprint of its equivalent public key JWK is exactly the same as the last
e1_fingerprint segment of the DID path.
The did:wba method specification does not specify specific HTTP API operations, but leaves programmatic registration and management to each implementation to define according to the requirements of its Web environment.
Creating a DID requires the following steps:
e1_ fingerprint segment according to Section 2.2.2;did.json file under the .well-known URL to represent the entire domain name, or under the specified path if multiple DIDs need to be resolved under the domain name.For example, for the domain name example.com, did.json will be available under the following URL:
Example: Creating a DID
did:wba:example.com
-> https://example.com/.well-known/did.json
The creation and hosting method of the naked domain name DID is consistent with the naked domain name entry of did:web: the domain name owner only needs to provide the corresponding DID document in /.well-known/did.json, and the DID can be used as the domain name subject identity or domain-level service identity.
If an optional path is specified instead of a naked domain name, and the default path scheme is used, did.json will be available under the path with the e1_ fingerprint segment:
Example: Creating a path-based DID with the default path scheme
did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>
-> https://example.com/user/alice/e1_<fingerprint>/did.json
If an optional port is specified on the domain name, the colon between the host and the port must be percent-encoded to prevent conflicts with the path.
Example: Creating a DID with an optional path and port
did:wba:example.com%3A3000:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>
-> https://example.com:3000/user/alice/e1_<fingerprint>/did.json
The following steps must be performed to parse a DID Document from a did:wba DID:
: with / in method-specific identifiers to obtain the fully qualified domain name and optional path.https:// to the expected DID document location./.well-known is appended./did.json to complete the URL.id of the parsed DID Document matches the did:wba DID being parsed.e1_ path type DID defined by the main specification, it must be verified according to the following strict binding relationship:
proof must exist;proof must pass DataIntegrityProof + eddsa-jcs-2022 verification;proof.verificationMethod MUST be Ed25519 Multikey (or a semantically equivalent Ed25519 verification method representation);proof.verificationMethod, and the result must be completely consistent with the last e1_ fingerprint segment of the DID path.e1_ DID, the above proof verification is not affected by the local policy switch, but is a necessary condition for successful parsing.proof, it should be verified according to the corresponding profile rules.For naked domain name DIDs, the parsing and verification process follows the same basic pattern as did:web naked domain name DIDs: parse /.well-known/did.json, check id consistency, and verify the verification method in the authentication relationship according to DID Core / HTTP Message Signatures rules; e1_ path binding verification does not apply.
To update the DID document, you need to update the did.json file corresponding to the DID.
For path type did:wba with the default path scheme, as long as the last bound key fingerprint of the DID path does not change, the DID itself will remain unchanged, but other contents of the DID document can change, for example, adding new verification keys, revoking old keys, or updating service endpoints.
If the binding key changes, the path DID MUST be changed to the new DID. At this time, a new DID document should be created, and an upper-layer Agent Name Service, similar to DNS, can be responsible for stable references and migration.
Note:
- Use a version control system such as git and a continuous integration system such as GitHub Actions to manage updates to DID documents, which can provide support for authentication and audit history.
- The HTTP API update process does not specify a specific HTTP API, but leaves programmatic registration and management to each implementer to define according to their needs.
To delete a DID document, the did.json file must be removed or otherwise no longer publicly available.
For path type did:wba using the default path scheme, if the binding key is permanently discarded, the rotation can also be completed by deactivating the old DID and creating a new DID; the stable reference relationship is maintained by an upper-layer Agent Name Service.
Whether the top-level proof field appears in a did:wba DID Document depends on the profile in use. For the default e1_ profile, proof is a required field; for other profiles, the DID Document MAY contain a top-level proof field to provide proof of document integrity. This field is used to prove that the DID Document has not been tampered with after the proof was generated and indicates that the signer controlled the corresponding private key when the proof was created. Proof itself does not replace DID method parsing, nor does it replace the id consistency check on its own.
For the default e1_ profile, the proof profile defined by the master specification MUST conform to:
The proof object contains the following fields:
type: required field. Fixed to DataIntegrityProofcryptosuite: required field. Fixed to eddsa-jcs-2022created: required field. Proof creation time, in XML Schema datetime formatverificationMethod: required field. Full DID URL pointing to Ed25519 Multikey in the DID Document used to generate the proofproofPurpose: required field. Fixed to assertionMethodproofValue: required field. Use base58-btc multibase (z...) encodingdomain: optional fieldchallenge: optional fieldAdditional constraints:
proof.verificationMethod MUST use e1_ to bind the key to unify DID path binding, public key binding and document integrity certification;proof.verificationMethod and verify that it is completely consistent with the last e1_ fingerprint segment of the DID path;proof MUST follow the standard algorithm process of eddsa-jcs-2022, and the algorithm details will no longer be rewritten by this specification.When parsing an e1_ did:wba DID Document, proof verification is not an optional enhanced check, but part of the path-binding semantics. If proof is missing, proof verification fails, or proof.verificationMethod is inconsistent with the e1_ binding fingerprint, parsing MUST fail.
For e1_ DIDs, there is no relaxed mode of "DID Document does not contain proof and can still be parsed".
For non-e1_ profiles, implementations MAY choose one of the following two modes according to the corresponding profile rules or local policy:
proof, parsing can still continue;proof in the DID Document MUST be regarded as a verification failure.Normative Note:
For DIDs using the e1_ profile, this specification requires that the top-level proof of the DID Document use the W3C standard Data Integrity proof mechanism. Its proof data model, proof configuration, document transformation, hashing, proof serialization and verification rules follow Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 and Data Integrity EdDSA Cryptosuites v1.0 respectively. This specification only restricts the use location, field requirements and verification relationship of proof in the did:wba scenario, and does not repeatedly define the underlying cryptographic algorithm; if a conflict occurs, the upstream W3C specification shall prevail.
For security and privacy considerations, please refer to did:web method specification section 2.6. Implementers should also pay additional attention to DID rotation caused by binding key changes under the default path scheme, and Agent Name Service synchronization issues.
Agents MAY use different DID methods as their identity mechanism. A conforming Agent Identity implementation MUST support resolution and verification for the following DID methods:
did:wbadid:webdid:webvhThe Agent Protocol does not require all agents to use the same DID method. Interoperability is achieved through method-specific DID resolution followed by common DID Document and authentication-relationship verification. Implementations MAY support additional DID methods, but MUST apply the specification of the method encoded in each DID.
The following examples illustrate the three supported DID methods:
did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>
did:web:example.com:agents:alice
did:webvh:<SCID>:example.com:agents:alice
In the did:webvh example, <SCID> is the required self-certifying identifier defined by the did:webvh method; it precedes the domain name and path.
did:webvh ValidationFor a did:webvh Agent Identity, an implementation MUST process the DID log according to the declared, supported version of the did:webvh method specification and derive the current DID Document only from a valid history. At a minimum, the resolver MUST validate the SCID, the ordered and hash-linked update chain, the authorization proofs for each applicable update, deactivation state, and any other method-version requirements before returning the current DID Document.
A verifier MUST fail resolution when the history is incomplete, inconsistent, uses an unsupported method version, or fails a required proof or hash-chain check. It MUST NOT authenticate an agent from an unvalidated current-state document obtained by bypassing the DID history.
When a client initiates a request to a server on a different platform, the client can use the domain name combined with TLS to authenticate the server, and the server verifies the client's identity based on an authentication verification method in the client's method-resolved DID Document.
When the client makes the first HTTP request, it uses the Signature-Input and Signature headers defined by RFC 9421 for signature; if the request carries a message body, it uses the Content-Digest header defined by RFC 9530 to bind the integrity of the message body. After the first verification is passed, the server can return the access token, and the client will carry the access token in subsequent requests. The server does not need to verify the client's identity every time, but only needs to verify the access token.
sequenceDiagram
participant Agent A Client
participant Agent B Server
participant DID Resolver
Note over Agent A Client,Agent B Server: First Request
Agent A Client->>Agent B Server: HTTP Request: Signature-Input, Signature, Content-Digest
Agent B Server->>DID Resolver: Resolve DID using its method
DID Resolver->>DID Resolver: Validate method-specific state or history
DID Resolver->>Agent B Server: Validated DID Document
Note over Agent B Server: Verify authentication relationship and HTTP signature
Agent B Server->>Agent A Client: HTTP Response: Authentication-Info(access token)
Note over Agent A Client, Agent B Server: Subsequent Requests
Agent A Client->>Agent B Server: HTTP Request: Authorization(access token)
Agent B Server->>Agent A Client: HTTP Response
Agents MUST resolve DID Documents according to the method-specific resolution rules identified by the DID in keyid. Resolver selection MUST be based on the method name encoded in the DID, not on separate descriptive metadata.
did:wba: Resolve the HTTPS did.json resource and apply the did:wba document, path-binding, and proof rules defined by this specification. A naked-domain DID uses https://<domain>/.well-known/did.json; a path-type DID uses the path transformation defined in the did:wba method section.did:web: Resolve the HTTPS did.json resource according to the native did:web transformation rules. A naked-domain DID uses /.well-known/did.json, while a path DID resolves to /<path>/did.json.did:webvh: Retrieve and process the method's did.jsonl log, validate the SCID and authorized update history, and derive the applicable DID Document according to the supported did:webvh method version.After method-specific resolution succeeds, the verifier MUST complete the method's identifier-consistency checks, confirm that the method has not reported the DID as deactivated, and verify that the verification method named by keyid exists and is authorized by the authentication relationship. Only then may the verifier use that verification method to authenticate the HTTP Message Signature.
Resolution or validation failure MUST fail authentication. Implementations MUST NOT fall back to another DID method or use an unvalidated document merely because it contains a matching public key.
When the current client initiates an HTTP request to the server for the first time, it needs to perform identity authentication according to the following method.
Clients MUST send authentication information using the Signature-Input and Signature header fields defined in RFC 9421. When a request includes a message body, the client MUST also send the Content-Digest header field defined in RFC 9530.
The minimum signature coverage set is as follows:
@method@target-uricontent-digest (when the request contains a message body)Recommended additional components for coverage are as follows:
@authoritycontent-typecontent-lengthThe key parameter requirements in Signature-Input are as follows:
keyid: MUST be a complete DID URL pointing to a verification method in the DID Document, for example did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1, did:web:example.com:agents:alice#key-1, or did:webvh:<SCID>:example.com:agents:alice#key-1.created: MUST, indicating the signature creation timeexpires: SHOULD, indicating the signature expiration timenonce: MAY be carried; if nonce is given in the server challenge, the client MUST use that noncealg: Non-required field. This specification does not mandate the use of the alg parameter, the verifier can determine the algorithm based on the DID verification method type pointed to by keyidThe client MUST sign with a key authorized by the DID Document's authentication relationship. For a path-type did:wba using the e1_ profile, the client SHOULD sign using the binding key corresponding to the final fingerprint segment. Other DID methods use their own method-specific control and update model and MUST NOT be required to satisfy the did:wba path-binding rule.
Client request example:
POST /orders HTTP/1.1
Host: api.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Digest: sha-256=:BASE64_SHA256_DIGEST:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "@authority" "content-digest");created=1733402096;expires=1733402156;nonce="abc123";keyid="did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>#key-1"
Signature: sig1=:BASE64_SIGNATURE:
Content-Digest value of the message body according to RFC 9530.authentication by the client's DID Document.
did:wba uses the Ed25519 binding key represented by Multikey (corresponding to the e1_ profile), it SHOULD sign using that key and the Ed25519 algorithm;Signature-Input, covering at least @method and @target-uri; if a message body exists, content-digest must also be covered.Signature header field.Signature-Input, Signature, and (if applicable) Content-Digest to the server.After receiving the client request, the server performs the following verification:
Signature-Input and Signature exist; when the request contains a message body, check whether Content-Digest exists.Content-Digest is consistent with the actual message body according to RFC 9530.keyid and parse DID: Extract keyid from Signature-Input to obtain the corresponding DID and verification method.keyid exists;authentication relationship of the DID document;did:wba DID using the e1_ profile, the DID binding relationship MUST be verified based on the Ed25519 public key corresponding to proof.verificationMethod instead of randomly selecting an Ed25519 key in authentication:
proof must exist and pass eddsa-jcs-2022 verification;e1_ fingerprint segment of the DID path.did:web, MUST NOT apply did:wba-specific path-binding or proof requirements;did:webvh, MUST validate the applicable DID history before using the resolved DID Document.Signature-Input, and verify that the HTTP components covered by the signature are consistent with the actual request.created / expires is within a reasonable time range. The recommended time window is 1 minute to 5 minutes, which is configurable by the implementer.(keyid, nonce) or equivalent keys;nonce comes from a server challenge, then nonce MUST be used one at a time.403 Forbidden is returned.401 Unauthorized is returned with challenge information attached.created, expires, nonce, keyid and other parameters from Signature-Input, and extract the corresponding signature value from Signature.keyid.Multikey, verify according to the 64-byte signature format of Ed25519;Content-Digest verification results should also be included in the overall certification conclusion.After the server-side verification is successful, the access token can be returned in the response. The access token is recommended to use JWT (JSON Web Token) format. The client's subsequent requests carry the access token. The server does not need to verify the client's DID identity every time, but only needs to verify the access token. The following generation process is not required by the specification and is for reference only. Implementers can define and implement it as needed.
JWT generation method reference RFC7519.
Assuming that the server uses JWT (JSON Web Token) as the Access Token format, JWT usually contains the following fields:
header and payload to ensure their integrityThe payload can contain the following fields (other fields are added as needed):
{
"sub": "did:wba:example.com:user:alice:e1_<fingerprint>",
"iat": "2024-12-05T12:34:56Z",
"exp": "2024-12-06T12:34:56Z",
"scope": "orders.read orders.write"
}
The server MUST return the access token via the Authentication-Info response header, not the Authorization response header.
Example:
Authentication-Info: access_token="eyJhbGciOi...", token_type="Bearer", expires_in=3600, scope="orders.read orders.write"
In order to reduce the risk of the token being directly reused after being leaked, it is recommended to use sender-constrained access token to bind the token to the key held by the client.
This version of the specification retains this extension capability, but does not yet fully define the specific profile of sender-constrained token. Implementers can reserve the following capabilities for future expansion:
cnf or equivalent field);token_type field.Before the sender-constrained profile is unified, for the sake of compatibility, you can use Bearer as the default token_type.
The client usually sends the Access Token via the Authorization header field in subsequent requests:
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
If the token_type returned by the server is not Bearer, the client MUST send the token according to the corresponding extension specification.
After receiving the client's request, the server extracts the Access Token from the Authorization header and performs verification, including verifying the signature, verifying the expiration time, verifying the fields in the payload, etc. The verification method refers to RFC7519.
3.2.4.1 401 response
When the server fails to verify the signature, Content-Digest fails to verify, the signature expires, there is a risk of replay, or the server requires the client to re-sign according to the challenge information, it can return a 401 Unauthorized response.
If the server requires that the client must use the nonce issued by the server for signature, it can return 401 when the client makes the first request and append the challenge information to the response. This adds an interaction that implementers can choose to use or not if needed.
Error information is returned through the WWW-Authenticate header field, and the server can also indicate the components it expects to cover in the next request through Accept-Signature. Examples are as follows:
WWW-Authenticate: AgentDID realm="api.example.com", error="invalid_signature", error_description="Signature verification failed.", nonce="xyz987"
Accept-Signature: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri" "@authority" "content-digest");created;expires;nonce;keyid
Cache-Control: no-store
The AgentDID authentication scheme name is method-neutral. The DID method is determined from the keyid value in Signature-Input.
Contains the following fields:
invalid_request: The request is malformed, missing required fields, or contains unsupported parametersinvalid_nonce: Nonce is used, is invalid, or does not match the server challengeinvalid_timestamp: timestamp out of rangeinvalid_did: The DID format is wrong, or the corresponding DID document cannot be found based on the DID.unsupported_did_method: The DID method is not supported by the implementation.invalid_did_history: Method-specific history validation, including did:webvh update-chain validation, failed.invalid_signature: Signature verification failedinvalid_verification_method: Unable to find the corresponding public key based on keyidinvalid_content_digest: Content-Digest does not match the message bodyinvalid_access_token: access token verification failedforbidden_did: DID does not have permission to access server resourcesnonce to regenerate the signature and reinitiate the requestAfter the client receives the 401 response, if the response carries nonce, it needs to use the server's nonce to regenerate the signature and reinitiate the request. If the response does not carry nonce, the client can regenerate the local nonce and try again.
It should be noted that the client and server need to limit the number of retries in their respective implementations to prevent an infinite loop.
3.2.4.2 403 response
When server-side authentication is successful, but the DID does not have the permission to access server-side resources, a 403 Forbidden response can be returned.
Privacy protection is very important in a decentralized network. For example, illegal software may record and track the user's behavior through the user's DID, causing the leakage of user privacy.
In this regard, we suggest that DID providers can adopt a multi-DID strategy, that is, generate multiple DIDs for one user, each DID has different roles and permissions, and uses different key pairs to achieve privacy protection and fine-grained permission control.
For example, a master DID is generated for the user. This DID generally does not change and is used in scenarios such as maintaining social relationships. Then a series of sub-DIDs are generated for the user, which can be used for shopping, ordering takeout, booking tickets and other scenarios. These sub-DIDs are subordinate to the main DID, and expired DIDs can be periodically deactivated and new DIDs applied to improve privacy and security protection.
For scenarios that require stable external references while allowing the underlying DID or DID Document to evolve according to its method-specific lifecycle, it is recommended to use an upper-layer Agent Name Service, similar to DNS.
Implementers need to consider the following security issues when implementing:
did:wba DIDs with the default path scheme, the binding key is best kept using hardware isolation, HSM, or the system enclave.authentication relationship. A path-type did:wba identity should prefer its bound key.did:wba path-type deployments SHOULD prefer the e1_ profile.(keyid, nonce), (keyid, jti) or equivalent keys; for challenge profile, nonce issued by the server must be used one at a time.created / expires time window in the request to prevent time rollback attacks. Generally speaking, the cache time of the server's replay cache should be longer than the signature expiration time.nonce, you must use a secure random number generator provided by the operating system, complying with modern cryptographic security specifications and standards. For example, you can use a module like Python's secrets to generate secure random numbers.Content-Digest to prevent the message body from being tampered with.did:wba DID using the e1_ profile, the parser MUST verify DataIntegrityProof. Other DID methods and profiles MUST be verified according to their own specifications and MUST NOT inherit this requirement merely by participating in the Agent Protocol.dNSName in subjectAltName and should not rely on Common Name.Authentication-Info response header.did:web: Objectives and ScopeThis section defines the Agent Protocol processing profile for native did:web.
The goal of this profile is to enable native did:web identities to access the capabilities defined in this specification without migration to did:wba, including but not limited to:
AgentDescription or externally defined service typesdid:web continues to be created, resolved, updated, and deactivated according to the did:web method specification. This section only defines how the common Agent Identity layer accepts and verifies native did:web.
When an implementation receives a native did:web, it MUST perform parsing according to the did:web method specification and complete at least the following checks:
did:web rules;id of the DID Document is completely consistent with the requested did:web;In compatibility mode, implementations MUST NOT enforce the following did:wba-specific checks on native did:web:
did:web parsing.If the native did:web DID Document itself carries a standard proof (such as Data Integrity proof), the implementation MAY perform verification according to the proof's declaration profile and local policy; however, the success of did:web parsing itself is not predicated on the proof rules of did:wba.
Native did:web is compatible with the cross-platform identity authentication process defined in the cross-platform authentication sections of this specification.
When the client uses did:web to participate in cross-platform authentication:
keyid still MUST be a complete DID URL;keyid exists;authentication relationship of the DID Document;Content-Digest verification use the common authentication process defined by this specification.In compatibility mode, the identity binding semantics of did:web comes from the parsing result of did:web itself, rather than the path binding public key fingerprint of did:wba.
Native did:web DID Documents MAY include service entries for agent description, name binding, messaging, or other application-level functions. This specification only defines how the DID and its verification methods are parsed and verified; it does not require support for every service type that may appear in the service array.
For example, an implementation might encounter the following service types:
AgentDescription: a service entry that points to an agent description document.ANPHandleService or ANPMessageService: examples of service types used by the external ANP ecosystem.The ANP service types above are illustrative examples only. ANP and this W3C Community Group protocol are distinct. This document does not define ANP endpoint formats, message flows, role models, capability negotiation, or the detailed semantics of fields such as serviceDid. Implementations MAY ignore unsupported service types, preserve them as metadata, or process them only when they explicitly implement the corresponding external protocol.
Native did:web is compatible with end-to-end encryption when its DID Document contains suitable keyAgreement entries and the application-layer protocol defines how to use them.
For example:
X25519KeyAgreementKey2019In compatibility mode, the prerequisites for E2EE capabilities are:
keyAgreement verification method exists;did:webvh Compatibility ProfileA did:webvh identity participates in the same cross-platform authentication, service discovery, Handle-based name binding, and end-to-end encryption capabilities as another supported Agent Identity, subject to the capabilities declared in its resolved DID Document.
Before using a did:webvh verification method, the implementation MUST complete the did:webvh history validation required by this specification. The verification method named by keyid MUST exist in the document derived for the applicable version and MUST be authorized by its authentication relationship.
did:wba-specific e1_ path-binding and DID Document proof rules MUST NOT be applied to did:webvh. The did:webvh SCID, update authorization, version, witness, portability, and deactivation semantics are instead governed by the supported version of the did:webvh method specification.
Implementers MUST distinguish between the following resolution and verification modes:
did:web specification;did:web identifiers;did:webvh method version;did:wba-specific path-binding or proof rules.Application implementations MUST NOT deny participation in cross-domain authentication or end-to-end encryption solely because a valid did:web or did:webvh identity does not contain did:wba-specific path bindings or proofs.
Deployments should select a DID method based on the required trust and lifecycle properties. The did:wba e1_ profile provides path-to-key binding, native did:web provides simple Web-hosted resolution, and did:webvh provides a self-certifying identifier and verifiable update history.
The core objective of the Agent Description module is to establish standardized agent description mechanisms, enabling agents to clearly publish their basic information, service capabilities, and interaction interfaces to other agents in the network, thereby achieving efficient capability discovery and collaboration matching:
Therefore, agent description protocols must possess good extensibility and semantic clarity, ensuring that different agents can accurately understand each other's capability boundaries.
The following example demonstrates an agent description document:
{
"@context": {
"@vocab": "https://schema.org/",
"ad": "https://example.com/ad#"
},
"@type": "ad:AgentDescription",
"name": "SmartAssistant",
"did": "did:web:agent.example.com:agents:alice",
"description": "An intelligent agent providing natural language processing capabilities",
"version": "1.0.0",
"interfaces": [
{
"@type": "ad:NaturalLanguageInterface",
"protocol": "YAML",
"url": "https://agent.example.com/alice/nl-interface.yaml"
}
]
}
This specification defines two core concepts for agent description: Information and Interface. These concepts provide a standardized framework for agents to publish information externally, ensuring that agents can effectively discover, understand, and interact with each other.
Information represents data resources that an agent provides to external entities. These resources can be structured or unstructured data used to describe the agent's capabilities, status, products, or services.
Information resources include but are not limited to the following types:
Information has the following key characteristics:
Interface defines standardized entry points for agents to engage in dynamic interactions with external entities. Interfaces provide callable representations of agent functionality, allowing other agents or systems to interact with them programmatically.
Interfaces are divided into the following two main categories:
Natural language interfaces provide agents with human language-based interaction capabilities. These interfaces allow the use of natural language queries and commands to access agent functionality.
Characteristics of natural language interfaces include:
Structured interfaces provide programmatic interaction methods based on predefined protocols and data formats. These interfaces follow standardized API design principles, ensuring predictability and efficiency.
Characteristics of structured interfaces include:
Agents implementing the protocol should follow the following priority and selection strategies when choosing interaction interfaces:
The protocol adopts a linked data-based interaction model that allows agents to organize their Information and Interfaces into a navigable data network through Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). This approach is similar to the hyperlink structure of the World Wide Web, enabling agents to construct their public data into a data network, where all data networks can be connected into an AI-accessible data network.
The core principle of the interaction model is based on the following architectural design:
Agents must use URLs as a unified addressing mechanism to organize their Information and Interface resources. Each URL points to a specific resource or interface definition, forming a traversable link graph. This design ensures:
It is recommended that each agent provide a primary entry point, typically manifested as an Agent Description Document. This document functions similarly to a website's homepage and contains:
The interaction process between agents is similar to how web crawlers work, starting from an entry point and proceeding with recursive navigation. The client agent first obtains the target agent's description document URL, retrieves the document through an HTTP request, and then parses the Information resource links and Interface definition links contained within. Based on task requirements, the client agent selectively accesses relevant URL links. If the retrieved resources contain further links, it continues recursive retrieval until sufficient information needed to complete the task is collected.
While gathering information, the client agent integrates this data in its local environment, formulates execution strategies, and selects appropriate Interfaces for invocation. The entire process emphasizes local decision processing, with sensitive information not passed to third parties but analyzed and processed locally at the client. Finally, the client agent executes specific operations through discovered Interfaces, processes return results, and completes tasks. This model ensures both privacy security and flexible on-demand information retrieval.
Fully leverages existing web technology stacks and infrastructure:
The local decision-making model provides important privacy protection advantages:
Note: This section is being continuously refined. We sincerely invite community members to contribute and jointly improve the technical specifications and implementation solutions for agent description standards.
The core objective of the Agent Discovery module is to establish efficient agent discovery mechanisms, enabling agents to be conveniently found and accessed by other agents in different network environments, thereby building dynamic and open agent collaboration networks:
This specification defines the Agent Discovery Service Protocol (ADSP), a standardized protocol for discovering agents. Based on the JSON-LD format, it provides two discovery mechanisms: active discovery and passive discovery, aimed at enabling agents to be effectively discovered and accessed by other agents or search engines in the network.
The core elements of the protocol include:
We use JSON-LD (JavaScript Object Notation for Linked Data) as the format for agent discovery documents, consistent with the Agent Description Protocol. By using JSON-LD, we can achieve rich semantic expression and linking relationships while maintaining simplicity and ease of use.
Agent description documents are detailed expressions of agent information, as referenced in the Agent Description Protocol. The agent discovery document serves as a collection page, containing URLs of all public agent description documents under a domain, facilitating indexing and access by search engines or other agents.
Active discovery refers to search engines or agents only needing to know a domain to discover all public agent description documents under that domain. We adopt the Web standard .well-known URI path as the entry point for agent discovery.
According to RFC 8615, .well-known URI provides a standardized way to discover services and resources. For agent discovery, we define the following path:
https://{domain}/.well-known/agent-descriptions
This path should return a JSON-LD document containing URLs of all public agent description documents under the domain.
Active discovery documents adopt the JSON-LD format, using the CollectionPage type, containing the following core properties:
@context: Defines the JSON-LD context used in the document@type: Document type, value is "CollectionPage"url: URL of the current pageitems: Array of agent description itemsnext: (Optional) URL of the next page, used for pagination scenariosEach agent description item contains:
@type: Type, value is "ad:AgentDescription"name: Agent name@id: URL of the agent description document (unique identifier of the resource){
"@context": {
"@vocab": "https://schema.org/",
"did": "https://w3id.org/did#",
"ad": "https://example.com/ns/agent-description#"
},
"@type": "CollectionPage",
"url": "https://example.com/.well-known/agent-descriptions",
"items": [
{
"@type": "ad:AgentDescription",
"name": "Smart Assistant",
"@id": "https://example.com/agents/smartassistant/ad.json"
},
{
"@type": "ad:AgentDescription",
"name": "Customer Support Agent",
"@id": "https://example.com/agents/customersupport/ad.json"
}
],
"next": "https://example.com/.well-known/agent-descriptions?page=2"
}
When there are a large number of agents under a domain, a pagination mechanism should be adopted. Pagination is implemented through the next property, pointing to the URL of the next page. Clients should recursively retrieve all pages until there is no next property.
Passive discovery refers to agents actively submitting their agent description URLs to other agents (typically search service agents), enabling them to index and crawl their information.
Passive discovery typically requires using the registration API provided by search service agents. These APIs are defined by the search service agents themselves and should be clearly stated in their agent description documents. Agents can register their description URLs with search services by calling these APIs.
sequenceDiagram
participant Agent as Agent
participant Search as Search Service Agent
Agent->>Search: Get agent description document
Search-->>Agent: Return description document (including registration API info)
Note over Agent: Parse registration API from description document
Agent->>Search: Send registration request (including own description URL)
Note over Search: Verify request
Search-->>Agent: Confirm registration
Note over Search: Crawl agent description document and index
To ensure the security of agent discovery, the following measures are recommended:
did:wba, did:web, or did:webvh) and apply its method-specific resolution and verification rules before authenticating an agentThe Agent Discovery Protocol is closely related to the following protocols:
did:wba, did:web, and did:webvhNote: This section is being continuously refined. We sincerely invite community members to contribute and jointly improve the technical specifications and implementation solutions for agent discovery standards.
The core objective of the Security Considerations module is to ensure the security of agents during interactions, establish multi-layered security protection systems, and maximize defense against various security threats and malicious attacks:
Therefore, agent security protocols must adopt defense-in-depth strategies, establishing corresponding security protection measures at the network layer, application layer, and data layer.
Note: This section is being continuously refined. We sincerely invite community members to contribute and jointly improve the technical specifications and implementation solutions for agent security standards.
The core objective of the Privacy Considerations module is to maximize the protection of personal privacy during agent interactions, ensuring that users' sensitive information is not improperly transmitted or leaked between agents, and establishing privacy-first interaction mechanisms:
Therefore, agent privacy protocols must make privacy protection a fundamental design principle, ensuring that technological progress does not come at the expense of user privacy.
Note: This section is being continuously refined. We sincerely invite community members to contribute and jointly improve the technical specifications and implementation solutions for agent privacy protection standards.